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Notes & Comments
Suing Organized Piracy:
An Application of Maritime Torts to
Pirate Attacks, and Subsequent Civil
Actions Against the Supporters of
Organized Piracy
Alistair Deans
BACKGROUND
In April of 2009, the United States held its breath as newly
inaugurated President Barack Obama faced what might arguably
have been his first midnight phone call. Pirates had attacked the
Maersk Alabama, a container ship carrying food to Kenya for the
World Food Program. 1  Behind the scenes, the crew locked
themselves in the engine room where they cut the power and
barricaded the hatch.2 Unfortunately, the pirates caught Captain
Richard Phillips and three others outside the engine room.3 After
1. Alan Cowell, Pirates Attack Maersk Alabama Again, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 2009, at A12; see also Pirates Constant Menace to Food Lifeline,
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.wfp.org/stories/pirates-
constant-menace-food-lifeline.
2. Mitra Malek, Pirated Ship's Steward 'Still Shaken Up', PALM BEACH
POST, May 1, 2009, at Al.
3. Id.
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some of the crewmen in the now 125 degree compartment
wounded a pirate during a scuffle, the other pirates fled with
Captain Phillips as warships closed on the drifting freighter.4 For
days, the pirates were trapped in the ship's lifeboat with their sole
hostage as the United States Navy followed closely behind.5
Media coverage was virtually around the clock as everyone waited
to see how the drama would unfold. Then, with no warning to the
watching world, Navy SEALs shot and killed all but one of the
pirates, rescuing Captain Phillips and ending the standoff.
6
President Obama had long since given the Navy a green light to
use appropriate force or kill the pirates in an emergency, earning
the Commander in Chief the respect of the armed forces and
getting the captain safely home.
7
Though no longer the romantic novel fodder it once was,
piracy persists throughout the world. Typical incidents are rather
mundane reporting for modern media, and range from high-speed
boats coming alongside large cargo ships at night, taking what
they can without being noticed and then leaving before sunrise, to
what may be loosely described as armed robbery at sea. 8 These
attacks occur across the globe, but appear to be centralized in a
few key locations, such as the south East Asian Sea, both the east
and west coasts of Africa, and the Caribbean Sea. 9 The last few
years however, have seen a developing system of organized piracy
off Somalia's coast, which has proven to be a game changer in
terms of scope and tactics.
Following the rescue of the crew, Richard Hicks, an able-
bodied seaman aboard the Maersk Alabama sued Maersk Line,
Limited and Waterman Steamship Corporation in Texas state
court under the Jones Act, claiming damages in excess of
4. Id.
5. Transcript of Lou DOBBS TONIGHT, CNN, (Apr. 13, 2009 7:00),
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0904/13[ldt.0l.html.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Int'l Chamber of Commerce Int'l Mar. Bureau [IMB], Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 1 January-31 December 2008,
Jan. 2009 at 43-70. The report plots every successful and unsuccessful
attempt at piracy in the world, with hot spots easily distinguishable. Id. at
88-92. Throughout all areas of the world other than Somalia and the Gulf of
Aden, pirate attacks are almost always either a version of silent or armed
robbery at sea. Id. at 43-70.
9. See id.
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$75,000.10 While this may seem litigious, especially since no such
litigation has ever been brought before, general maritime law
("GML") and some particular maritime statutes, including the
Jones Act, allow for exactly this sort of action. 
11
This Comment proposes that litigation based on pirate
attacks should be encouraged because a fundamental goal of tort
law is the encouragement of better preventative measures in the
future by holding accountable those who are best able to take
those measures. This Comment will examine a strategy for not
only compensating victims of piracy via maritime litigation, but
also for employing the litigation as a weapon against the
institution of organized piracy. Part I will explain how Somali
pirates are unique among modern pirates. Part II will analyze the
utility of the Jones Act in making pirate victims whole. Part III
will explore some possibilities for a contribution action by Jones
Act defendants against supporters of piracy to bleed away their
funding and spending, using suits against terrorist organizations
for guidance.
This Comment will conclude with an explanation of how, if
used as an economic weapon against the allies of organized piracy,
American jurisprudence might work in conjunction with
politicians at home and abroad as well as the international
militaries in a three pronged attack to effect the necessary
infrastructure change on the ground in Somalia to end its pirate
problem. While this Comment will focus on Somalia, it is
important to remember that several areas of the world either have
piracy or suffer similar states of lawlessness. Though it may seem
cheap and easy for parties to simply pay the ransoms for now,
Somali piracy as an institution must be stamped out quickly lest
10. Complaint at 1,3,4, Hicks v. Waterman S.S. Corp., No. 2009-26129
(Dist. Ct. of Harris Cnty., Tex. Apr. 27, 2009). Richard Hicks reserved the
right to amend his complaint for further damages and specifically requested a
jury trial. Id. at 8.
11. Hicks v. Waterman was removed to the Southern District of Texas in
May of 2009 on the somewhat confused argument that the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 preempts the Jones Act, which it does
not. The case was then remanded to the District Court of Harris County,
Texas, in September of 2009, and was voluntarily dismissed without
prejudice by Mr. Hicks in December of 2009. Court documents are listed
under Case No. 200926129 at http://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/eDocs/
Public/Search.aspx.
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foreign organizations spring up in its image.
I. ORGANIZED PIRACY
In order to turn a Jones Act litigation into something more
than a relief mechanism for pirate victims, we must first
understand the causes and system of organized piracy. While a
Brandeis-like examination of every conceivable fact or rumor is
beyond the scope of this Comment, Part I will lay some
groundwork for understanding what is happening and how we
might prevent it in the future.
A. The Causes
Following a brief respite in late 2006, the world saw a
dramatic increase in pirate activity off the coast of Somalia, a
growth to which the Maersk Alabama eventually fell victim.
12
The rise of piracy off Somalia is explained rather easily.
Following the disintegration of Siad Barre's central authority
around 1990, Somalia degenerated into a state of clan warfare,
with neighboring countries faring little better. 13  With the
exception of brief control in 2006 by the Union of Islamic Courts,
Somalia has experienced a complete lack of central government for
nearly twenty years. 
14
The Ethiopian backed Transitional Federal Government
ousted the Union of Islamic Courts in late 2006, causing a surge in
chaos and violence as an Islamic insurgency flared in Mogadishu,
killing tens of thousands and leaving a million homeless.15 Even
though the African Union sent troops to restore order, militias,
including the allegedly al-Qaeda linked al Shabaab, began
targeting peacekeepers, leaving only portions of Mogadishu under
some form of governmental control by mid-2009.16 In the midst of
12. Thean Potgieter, The lack of maritime security in the Horn of Africa
region: scope and effect, 31 STRATEGIC REV. S. AFR., May 1, 2009 at 4,
available at 2009 WLNR 19153858. Piracy in Somalia began growing in the
late 1990s as the government situation in Somalia deteriorated. Id. at 2, 4.
Piracy rates dropped in 2006 following the seizure of Mogadishu by the Union
of Islamic Courts ("UIC"), only to re-emerge strong after Somali and
Ethiopian troops ousted the UIC. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at2.
14. Id. at 2-3.
15. Id. at2.
16. Potgieter, supra note 12, at 2.
SUING ORGANIZED PIRACY
this civil war, the northern region of Somaliland claimed
independence, and the central eastern region of Puntland
increasingly began asserting autonomy. Neither is recognized as
a state, but Mogadishu does not have enough authority to control
them. 17 To break the situation down succinctly, since the militia
commander Muhammed Farah 'Aideed' took Mogadishu in 1990,
Somalia has been a land of chaos, banditry, mass starvation, and
civil violence perpetuated by warlords.' 8  Coastal policing has
utterly disappeared.
One of the chief coastal resources for Somalis is tuna, 19 which
provided hope to local sailors and former militiamen that they
might scratch a living from an otherwise devastated land without
serving a warlord. With the utter collapse of any significant
source of local leadership, coastal rights for Somalis came under
attack by foreign fishing fleets using destructive fishing
practices. Likewise, nearby countries considered the lawless
Somali coast an ideal place to dump toxic waste. 21 As a result, a
desperate but well-armed citizenry took the law into their own
hands and began boarding the offending foreign ships to demand
tolls for trespassing into Somali waters, and in some cases simply
to bully the foreign sailors into leaving.
22
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Musse Gabobe Hassan & Mahamud Hassan Tako, Illegal Fishing
and Dumping Hazardous Wastes Threaten the Development of Somali
Fisheries and the Marine Environment (September 7-9, 1999),
http://www.mbali.info/doc236.htm. The report lists 17 other fish that make
up Somali catches, as well as 2 shellfish. Id. See also CIA, THE WORLD
FACTBOOK, 2009, https://www.cia.govflibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/so.html#Econ (last visited Mar. 11, 2011) (noting that fish are a
principal export of Somalia, and that "[i]n the absence of a formal banking
sector, money transfer/remittance services have sprouted throughout the
country, handling up to $1.6 billion in remittances annually.").
20. Hassan & Tako, supra note 19.
21. Id.
22. Somali citizens assert that illegal fishing is main cause of the piracy
in Somalia. Robyn Hunter, Somali Pirates Living the High Life, BBC NEWS,
Oct. 28, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hilafrica/
7650415.stm (comment by Abdulkadil Mohamed, resident of Garowe). See
also In Crisis-Ridden Somalia, Enjoying the 'Piracy Bubble" THE SOMALILAND
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, available at http://www.somalilandtimes.netsl2008/
352/27.shtml (interview with pirate commander Abdi Garad who asserts that
they are defending their waters against toxic dumping and plundering of
resources; pirate Jama Ahmed adds that they are merely taxing offenders as
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These humble beginnings of this arguably necessary
vigilantism on the high seas quickly evolved into a sophisticated
business. Somalia's ever-present warlords and military trained
citizenry easily organized themselves into what some locals call a
coast guard,23 some call the Somali Marines,24 but most recognize
as modern pirates. Today's piracy is not a free-for-all of high seas
renegades, but instead an organized and sophisticated system of
criminal activity. 25  Section B reveals some details of this
organization, which show that a telling difference between
Somalia's organized piracy and that of the rest of the world is the
tactics employed. While most of the rest of the world's pirate
incidents could be classified as silent or armed robbery, all but two
of the attacks off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden are some form of
hijacking and ransom.26 This dramatic shift from modern pirate
tactics correlates to and probably spawned increased pirate
aggressiveness off the remainder of Africa's coast in the last two
the government would do if it could). An analysis of worldwide pirate attacks
in 2008 shows that attacks on fishing vessels account for a much higher
percentage of total attacks off Somalia than anywhere else, making pirate
victims off Somalia three times as likely to be fishermen as they would be
anywhere else on earth. IMB, supra note 8, at 43-87. This statistic is either
the result of Somali pirates specifically targeting fishing boats, or the result
of a higher percentage of fishing boats in the Somali area, an area known as a
heavy commercial lane. Interestingly all fishing vessels attacked off Somali
were not Somali, while all fishing vessels attacked in the rest of the world
were local to the regions in which they were attacked. Id. The details of the
pirate attacks can be found in the International Maritime Bureau's 2008
report on worldwide piracy. Id.
23. Hunter, supra note 22. Resident Abdulkadil Mohamed asserts that
the pirates there call themselves "coastguards" rather than pirates. Id.
24. Mohammed Adow, The pirate kings of Puntland, ALJAZEERA (June
16, 2009, 7:17) http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/06/20096141
25245860630.html (interviewing Said Elmi Mohamud, a resident of Eyl).
25. See Pirates turn hi-tech: Interpol reveals organised crime link to
Somalia, HERALD SUN (Melbourne), Oct. 15, 2009. Jean-Michel Louboutin,
executive director of police services at Interpol, calls Somali piracy organized
crime controlled by syndicates. Id.
26. IMB, supra note 8, at 43-70. For the purpose of analyzing the style of
attacks only the attacks listed by IMB as successful were used, as those that
were unsuccessful leave one to guess at what the pirates' intentions may
have been. One incident in the Gulf of Aden would be better classified as
armed robbery; another incident in the Gulf of Aden would be better
classified as a repulsed attack and probably should have been in the
unsuccessful list. Id. at 56-62, 75-85. Of all the tforty-four attacks in the
Gulf of Aden thirty-nine appear to have been linked to Somalia, and the
remaining five are of unknown origin. Id. at 56-62.
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years.
27
B. The Business
In Somalia, piracy is proving to be one of the few profitable
industries. The town of Eyl is one of the main pirate strong points
due to its location 2 8 and has become a boomtown where pirates are
buying Mercedes-Benzes and are building fancy houses. 29  It
usually takes three or four pirate attacks to capture a single ship
for ransom, and each attack's preparation costs a little over
$30,000.30 Pirates obtain this money via ransoms as well as from
financers (including local and foreign businessmen, wealthy
expatriates, and Islamic militant group al-Shabaab) who receive
up to 50% of the ransom.3 1 The pirates do not skirt about the seas
haphazardly, but instead target specific ships long before they
have arrived in the area.32 To do this, they use a combination of
internet searches and information provided by their overseas
contacts. 33 Despite the staggering increase in successful attacks,
the risk to individual vessels remains low thanks to the heavy
volume of commercial traffic in the area, a factor that favors the
pirates because they can continue attacking ships without
provoking a determined response from the shipping industry.
34
At least two legitimate organizations are profiting from
organized piracy off Somalia. Maritime insurance and security
contractors have each realized profits from contributing to
resolution of pirate attacks. With demand in Iraq decreasing,
27. Id. at 55-62. For the rest of Africa excluding Somali, the year began
with regular attacks of armed or silent robbery, but towards the end of the
year pirates were becoming more violent and almost all of their attacks are
better classified as armed robbery. Id. at 62-70.
28. See Scott Carney, Cutthroat Capitalism, WIRED, July 2009, at 110.
North of Eyl is the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden where the majority of
attacks occur. All ships coming through the Suez Canal, which connects the
Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean, must pass through the Gulf of Aden.
This commerce route sees 7.5% of annual sea trade. Id.
29. William Reed, The Business of Piracy, BIRMINGHAM TIMs, Apr. 16,
2009, at A4.
30. Carney, supra note 28. This figure is based on a twelve-man pirate
crew, some attacks involve crews of up to one hundred men. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (interview of unnamed pirate from Eyl).
34. Id.
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security contractor companies now act as negotiators between ship
owners and pirates when a ransom is demanded.35 Not only do
they make calls back and forth over the course of repeated
attacks, thus establishing trust with the pirates for future
negotiations, they also handle the drop off of the cash.36 With the
drop off costing about $1 million, the addition of all the other fees
can make their price as high as the ransom.
37
Meanwhile, maritime insurance has begun selling kidnap and
ransom ("K&R") policies based on individual charters. 38  By
purchasing K&R policies, carriers are assured of coverage in the
event of a pirate attack, whereas protection and indemnity ("P&I")
insurance, hull policies, and war risk coverage are arguably not
applicable and may require legal action to enforce. 39 The price of
a $3 million K&R policy skyrocketed from a few thousand dollars
to about $30,000 from April of 2008 to April of 2009.40 With about
20,000 ships traversing the area in 2008 and around forty
successfully attacked 4 1 even if only half the ships bought full
policies and each of the attacked ships had such a policy resulting
in a $3 million ransom (which was not nearly the case), and
security contractors took an equal share for their services,
insurance companies would still profit by $60 million.42 Despite
the costs for carrier companies, commerce will continue through
the area simply because it is cheaper to buy the K&R policies than
35. Id.
36. Id. Because of Somalia's complete lack of modern banking, ransoms
are always paid in cash. Mohamed Olad Hassan & Elizabeth Kennedy,
Somali Pirates Transform Villages into Boomtowns, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov.
20, 2008, available at 2008 WL 22119128.
37. Carney, supra note 28.
38. Cyril Tuohy, The Recasting of Purpose: With hull policies excluding
terrorism, carriers have extended their kidnap-and-ransom policies to cover
piracy risks on a per-transit basis, RISK & INS., Aug. 2009, at 21.
39. Id.
40. Carney, supra note 28.
41. Id.
42. (10,000 ships x $30,000 annual premium -$120 million ransoms paid
- $120 million for contractor services = $60 million profit). In all likelihood,
more than half the shipping industry will buy these policies, contractor costs
are not always as high as ransoms, and only the highest ransoms were $3
million; however, not all ships seeking coverage will buy the full $3 million
policy; so the $60 million profit for insurance is a rough estimate. Insurance
companies are, however most assuredly profiting from the risks involved.
This Comment is not implying immorality, but merely points out this fact for
practical analysis.
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it is to bypass this important sea-lane. 4 3
It would appear piracy is flourishing not only because of local
lawlessness, but because the organizations involved (pirates,
financers, insurance, security contractors, and even the carriers)
are profiting more by tolerating it than they would by addressing
it.
C. Methods of Support
As this Comment focuses on judicial methods that can combat
piracy without inflaming the situation, it is necessary to identify
where the pirates get their support. While ransom money is
revitalizing the impoverished Somali coast, any civil action
brought against the formerly poverty stricken Somalians would be
unadvisable, for it would further alienate the western world in the
eyes of people who thought they were doing what they had to do to
survive. Therefore, while this note examines a litigation route
against piracy, it should be clear that such actions should not
target those parties who acted out of desperation, such as some
early pirates and local Somalians in pirate towns, but rather
target the people who supported piracy or failed to take necessary
steps against piracy, such as ship owners, charterers, Somalian
diaspora, and businesses.
It is no secret that organized piracy in Somalia is growing.
Nor is it wild speculation to infer that the pirates are receiving
support from somewhere. Pirate Ahmed Dahir Suleyman says,
"[W]e have negotiators, translators and agents in many
areas.. .let me say across the world. These people help us during
exchanges of ransom and finding out the exact person to negotiate
with. ' 4  Allegations abound that the Somali diaspora
(communities of expatriate Somalis living abroad but maintaining
ties to their homeland)4 5 in Canada, Minneapolis, and many other
43. See Carney, supra note 28. It costs millions of dollars extra and an
additional 10,000 miles to go around Cape Horn rather than through the
Suez Canal and into "Pirate Alley." In addition, Cape Horn substitutes the
small risk of piracy for the arguably more substantial risk of notoriously bad
weather. See id.
44. Somali Pirates Get Help From Expats in Canada, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Dec. 11 2008, available at http://www.thestar.com/News/World/articlel
552023134 (interview with pirate Ahmed Dahir Suleyman in Eyl).
45. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 345 (11th ed. 2004).
Diaspora is defined as "people settled far from their ancestral homelands." -d.
2011] 663
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places throughout the western world send pirates both
information about shipping itineraries as well as money to fund
the attacks.46 Due to the lack of modern financial institutions in
Somalia, diaspora send money through an informal, honor based
financial system called "hawala," which requires special operators
to take money from the sender at one end and instructs a friend,
relative, or other agent at the other end to hand money over to the
recipient. 47 However, wiring services are also used for part of the
journey between North America and East Africa. 48
In addition to monetary aid from wealthy relatives living
abroad,49 pirates are most certainly transacting with nearby
businesses. Take for example the simple act of counting a ransom.
The pirates are known to use the same money-counting machines
that foreign exchange bureaus employ around the world to ensure
it is not counterfeit. 50 In a country with no effective banking
system that necessitates all cash payments, 51 one is left to wonder
where former fishermen and militiamen acquired such equipment.
Luckily, the pirates themselves are all too willing to explain
themselves to reporters; "[g]etting this equipment is easy for us,
we have business connections with people in Dubai, Nairobi,
Djibouti and other areas.. .we send them money and they send us
what we want."52 While businessmen, diaspora, and others who
support and benefit from organized piracy will undoubtedly deny
the allegations, evidence of these transactions most certainly
exists. Therefore, a proper investigation by experienced attorneys,
private investigators, or law enforcement should turn up quite a
few businesses in the wealthier neighboring areas around Somalia
that are knowingly selling goods and services to pirates, as well as
investors throughout the world.53
46. Mohamed Ahmed, Somali Sea Gangs Lure Investors at Pirate Lair,
REUTERS, Dec. 1, 2009 available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?
aid=USTRE5BO1Z920091201; Somali Pirates, supra note 41.
47. See Somali Pirates, supra note 41.
48. Id.
49. It should be remembered that Somali culture is clan based, making a
never before met relative pirate in Eyl closer to expatriates living in Toronto
than the people living two blocks away. See generally, Potgieter, supra note
12.
50. Hassan & Kennedy, supra note 34.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Reed, supra note 29.
SUING ORGANIZED PIRACY
D. Possible Solutions
As stated earlier, aside from making a plaintiff whole through
recovery, a primary goal of torts is the deterrence of harmful or
inefficient behavior. In the grand scheme of things, one might
argue that Somali piracy is a temporary difficulty that will result
in long-term improvements. Specifically, it deters illegal fishing
and dumping of toxic waste, and it is transferring wealth from
those who have plenty to those that have little. This wistful
approach aside, piracy is a recognized as wrong worldwide, and
not even the Somalis like to think of these men as pirates,
preferring to think of them as militias, coast guardsmen, or
Marines. While the people of Somali should not be left to starve,
neutral seafarers should not be required to suffer for them.
Equity demands that the victims of piracy be made whole and
piracy be stopped, but depriving the Somali people, for whom life
has been so difficult for so long, of their few meager gains would
be distasteful and probably pointless.
Making victims of piracy whole is fully within the powers of
maritime torts. While monetary compensation might never fully
replace what a victim has lost, it is the system in place.
Eradicating piracy takes more. While the militaries of many
countries can be set loose on the pirates, force will only go so far
and it will cost a great amount of tax dollars not to mention man
hours. Naval ships cannot be everywhere at once, and
interceptions typically occur only after a distress signal is
received.5 4 This is a reactive approach, and if relied upon it will
drain our servicemen, national budget, and leave a high risk that
the call will be too late and another Maersk Alabama-like standoff
will ensue, with no guarantees of a second success.
Military force must be supplemented. Political action would
likely help a great deal by eradicating some of the causes of
piracy. 55 For example, having the navies in the region search for
illegal fishing vessels or illegal dumpers, or commissioning
investigations of these activities, or sponsoring some type of
United Nations involvement would likely deter or even halt the
54. This Comment's assertion that most military actions against piracy
is reactionary is based on numerous incidents occurring in 2008 and 2009.
55. To date, there has been some successes against piracy in Puntland
attributable to political action.
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illegal fishing and dumping. By giving Somalia what it needs in
the form of policing territorial waters, politicians could destroy the
moral foundation of Somali pirates, who purport to be protecting
their country's interests. Other political solutions surely abound
but are beyond the scope of this Comment.
In examining possible solutions, one must not ignore the
probability that while Somali piracy seems to have begun as a
response to injustice, it has now grown into something else.
Current accounts reveal an organized business based on the
inability of foreign powers to control an area where business is
more willing to pay the fines than to pay for the change. A ready
analogy might be drawn to organized crime, which thrives where
commerce exists in a relatively lawless area. In the case of
maritime commerce, it is simply cheaper to risk or even suffer
ransom payments than it is to pay for counter piracy methods
such as alternate routes or security teams, 56 therefore the carriers
take the risk.
If piracy has morphed from a necessary evil into organized
crime, than eradication of the causing problems will do little more
than unmask it for what it truly is. In this likely scenario, the
only real way to stop it, short of the desirable but unlikely return
of effective government to Somalia, is to make it unprofitable as a
business. 57 Victims of terrorism have been suing terrorists for a
number of years now for the dual purposes of recovery and
weakening the economic support of terror networks. 58 It follows
that this approach can also be applied to organized piracy.
II. MAKING THE VICTIMS WHOLE
The first question posed by this Comment is whether a victim
of piracy may bring a Jones Act claim against his or her employer;
56. To date it appears that many carriers have employed private
security teams for their ships, which have met with some success. Of note
was the second attack on the Maersk Alabama, which an onboard private
security team repulsed.
57. Some might argue for an all-out military operation, citing American
success against the Barbary Pirates in the early 1 9 tb century; however, this
Comment simply presumes that the western world's track record of planning
and supporting military operations in developing countries is not promising.
58. See John D. Shipman, Comment, Taking Terrorism to Court: A Legal
Examination of the New Front in the War on Terrorism, 86 N.C. L. REV. 526,
568-70 (2008).
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and the simple answer is yes. This part of the Comment will
examine how the Jones Act and other maritime causes of action
may be applied to people who are hijacked, kidnapped, injured, or
killed by pirates. It will ultimately conclude that, because of the
notice provided to shippers and carriers, a failure to take the
advised precautions against piracy will likely support a finding
that the ship was unseaworthy at the start of the voyage, making
a ship owner liable to the seamen aboard for any resulting harm.
This will have the dual results of making the victim whole, as well
as placing an additional monetary burden on maritime insurance,
which may then refocus on the institution of organized piracy.
A. Hypothetical
Setting the Maersk Alabama and other actual incidents aside,
consider a hypothetical pirate attack. A United States flagged
container ship named Kill Devil Hills is scheduled to transit the
Gulf of Aden. Bogue Island Inc. owns it and Carrier Lines Ltd.
charters it. Many of the containers contain commercial
electronics, such as laptop computers, and stereo equipment. The
managing agent of the corporation, Mr. Agent, saw the news
reports on piracy but has not been informed of the International
Maritime Bureau's warnings and recommendations for safe
passage. Though he could alter the route, coordinate with the
international armada, hire private security, or equip the ship with
barbed wire he does none of these things. Mr. Agent has done the
math and decided it would be less expensive to buy a kidnapping
and ransom policy with a liability clause from his maritime
insurance provider.
Meanwhile, in the weeks prior to passing through the gulf,
the American crew aboard the Kill Devil Hills undergoes some
rudimentary anti-piracy training led by the well-intentioned but
unrealistic master of the vessel, Captain Daring. He shows them
hand-to-hand techniques, advises them in ship handling
maneuvers for warding off a pirate attack, and provides
doughnuts and coffee. Meanwhile, phone calls are placed from
communities of Somali diaspora in Maine, Canada, and France to
Eyl, Somalia. Several more phone calls follow, along with wire
transfers from several bank accounts in the first three locations to
an account in Dubai. Transfers from the Dubai bank account are
issued to business dealers in Kenya for undisclosed purposes.
6672011]
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Coastal Kenyans soon notice workers loading electronics
equipment, rifles, ammunition, one heavy machine gun, several
rocket propelled grenades, food, gasoline, qat (a local stimulant),
lines, grappling hooks, and medical supplies into an old, ratty
looking skiff with twin high-powered engines. A well-trained
machinist and an English interpreter arrive and board the boat
with a crew recently arrived from a stolen Yemenis fishing vessel
anchored offshore. They leave Kenyan waters and unite with the
fishing vessel, which then heads for the Gulf of Aden.
The Kill Devil Hills goes through the Gulf of Aden, having
picked up a passenger, and is attacked by twelve Somali Pirates
carrying grappling hooks, AK 47s, and electronics equipment in a
ratty looking skiff with twin high powered engines. The crew uses
the training Captain Daring provided, by maneuvering, firing the
high-pressure hose at the pirates, then fleeing to the bridge where
they make a stand as the chief engineer disables their reduction
gear. In the ensuing fight, two Somali pirates are injured as well
as two American crewmen; several others receive minor injuries.
The pirates haul the crew and passengers onto the forecastle and
make a big show of planning to execute them all for resisting.
Eventually, the pirate leader cools the rest down, and the crew
and passenger are locked in the pantry. At all times, the master
of the ship, Captain Daring, keeps their hopes up and acts as their
spokesperson with their captors. Sadly, the passenger has a heart
attack and dies. Soon after, the pirate machinist fixes the broken
reduction gear and the Kill Devil Hills is sailed towards Eyl.
Meanwhile, Mr. Agent contacts his insurance which
negotiates a quick ransom of four million, costing an additional
two million in negotiation and delivery fees, and the Kill Devil
Hills is released. After evacuating the two severely injured
crewmembers by helicopter the vessel arrives in France just in
time to satisfy the carriage contract. However, two containers of
valuable electronics are heat damaged. Meanwhile, two of the
slightly injured crewmembers are showing signs of posttraumatic
stress disorder ("PTSD"), one of the two severely injured crewmen
succumbs to her wounds and dies in the hospital, and the other
has lost an eye, has a crippled right leg, and is also showing signs
of PTSD. The crew is now seeking justice.
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B. The Jones Act and General Maritime Law
Since 1789, the United States Constitution has granted to
federal courts jurisdiction in all cases of maritime and admiralty
giving the United States Supreme Court ("the Court") appellate
jurisdiction. 59 Since that time, federal courts fashioned a unique
brand of general maritime law ("GML"), which provides certain
protection to sailors, longshoremen, and sea-going passengers. In
1903, the Court held that under the GML an injured seaman could
not bring a negligence action against an employer, officer, or agent
absent a finding that the negligence was tantamount to
unseaworthiness. 60 Generally, a vessel is unseaworthy if it was
not reasonably fit for its intended purpose when it began its
voyage. The GML, instead, allowed an injured seaman to sue for
housing, food, and wages due from the time of injury to the
completion of the voyage, as well as medical expenses incurred
from the time of injury until the seaman attained maximum
recovery (either the seaman is fully healed, dead, or medical
science can simply do no more). 6' People were appalled that a
sailor injured because a ship was unseaworthy could recover more
than maintenance and cure, but a sailor injured only because of a
master's negligence could not. In 1915, the United States
Congress addressed the situation by creating a statutory remedy
for seamen who suffer injury or death during the course of
employment due to negligence even when the vessel is
seaworthy.62  This congressional action became known as the
Jones Act and has provided a remedy for seamen injured or killed
on the job for most of the twentieth century. 63
The Jones Act provides, in pertinent part, that any "seaman
injured in the course of employment" may bring suit "with the
59. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
60. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
61. Id. Maintenance and cure is almost always recoverable. All that is
generally required is that a sailor's illness or injury be sustained while the
sailor was in service of the ship, and that the illness or injury is neither
intentionally self-inflicted nor the result of some willful and wanton
misconduct. Recovery consists of lost wages for the voyage as well as food,
lodging, and medical expenses until maximum cure has been achieved.
62. See 46 U.S.C. § 30104(a) (2006).
63. Id.
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right of trial by jury, against the employer." 64 The standards for
recovery for negligence are those applied in the Federal
Employers' Liability Act ("FELA").65 FELA provides that an
employer is liable for any defects caused "in whole or in part" by
its negligence. 66  While contributory negligence may reduce a
plaintiffs recovery it never eliminates it.6 7 Further, there is no
contributory negligence where an employer's negligence includes
violation of a statute intended to prevent the injury
suffered.58There is no assumption of risk in the face of a relevant
safety statute violation or where the injury was caused by the
negligence of the employer's "officers, agents, or employees."
69
FELA is, however, rather vague on what specific types of damages
are permitted, so the courts have read this to mean that the Jones
Act "[i]ncorporat[ed] FELA unaltered" and, accordingly, FELA's
history of damage awards was now that of the Jones Act. 70
Note that FELA imposes liability for any defect caused "in
whole or in part" by an employer's negligence, and that there is no
assumption of risk in the face of a relevant safety statute
violation. 71 The Jones Act incorporates these and all other FELA
provisions, creating a benefit for pirate victims thanks to the
imposition of liability for any defects and simply asks jurors to
decide whether "employer negligence played any part, even the
slightest, in producing the injury or death. 72 Therefore the Jones
Act uses a minimal standard, any negligence, however minute, is
enough to make an employer completely liable for any injuries
resulting. 
73
64. Id. This paper will ignore the issues of who qualifies as a seaman,
employer, or vessel as well as what point in time employment begins and
ends.
65. 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (2006).
66. Id. §§ 51, 52.
67. Id. § 53.
68. Id.
69. Id. §§ 53, 54.
70. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990). The pertinent
discussion specifically addresses the wrongful death section of FELA but the
discussion is applicable to injury as well.
71. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 54.
72. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957)
(citing Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 (1957)).
73. Id.; see also Litherland v. Petrolane Offshore Constr. Servs., 546 F.2d
129, 131 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that negligence that plays any part, however
small, in causing the injuries creates liability).
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However, while Jones Act litigation bars an assumption of
risk defense, courts sometimes take the facts supporting risk
assumption and instead apply them to comparative negligence for
reduction of damages. 74 As you can see, the Jones Act essentially
uses only comparative negligence to reduce a tort victim's
recovery.
In addition to the ability to recover for any damage, however
slight, and the abolishment of contributory negligence as a
complete bar to recovery, plaintiffs in Jones Act cases
automatically have a statutory right to a trial by jury75 and may
generally allege both negligence and unseaworthiness.
Seaworthiness claims mirror strict liability claims, in that an
owner can be liable without having knowledge of any defects.
76
Seaworthiness is a warranty requiring an owner, or even an
owner pro hac vice, to provide a reasonably safe working
environment via proper equipment and a properly trained crew.
77
Typically, courts in admiralty prefer "to give than to withhold the
remedy,"78 and the history of Jones Act application evidences
courts' willingness to permit seaman recovery in most situations.
For example, the Court has upheld findings of unseaworthiness
where a ship was not properly equipped with an ice cream
chipper, 79 where one of the crewmen became homicidal but
exhibited absolutely no signs until underway, 80 and even where a
74. E.g., Rivera v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 474 F.2d 255, 257-58 (2d Cir.
1973), cert denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973) (holding that a plaintiffs knowledge of
hazardous condition without evidence of an additional negligent act was not
sufficient to establish contributory negligence because assumption of risk has
been abolished by statute); but see Rouchleau v. Silva, 217 P.2d 929, 933 (Cal.
1950) (holding that assumption of risk facts could instead be applied to
apportionment of damages under theory of comparative negligence).
75. 46 U.S.C. § 30104(a) (2006).
76. Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1952).
77. Id.
78. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970)
(quoting The Sea Gull, 21 F.Cas. 909, 910 (C.C.Md. 1865)).
79. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 522-23
(1957) (holding that reasonable jury could conclude that employer was
negligent when baker cut his hand on butcher knife trying to chip hard ice
cream where (1) employer had failed to furnish ship's baker with ice chipper,
(2) ice cream was removed from deep freeze too late to thaw, and (3) chef had
instructions to provide prompt service).
80. Keen, 194 F.2d at 518 (requiring a crewmember, like equipment
aboard the ship, to be "equal in disposition and seamanship to the ordinary
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worn out wrench slipped, hitting the plaintiffs toe, resulting in
gangrene and the amputation of his leg .8'Admiralty courts will
submit the question of liability to the jury so long as there is the
slightest conceivable possibility of a causal link; the warranty of
seaworthiness can apply to almost anything and requires no
affirmative action or knowledge on the defendant's part; and there
is often a thin line between negligence and unseaworthiness.
An examination of likely recoveries is necessary for a useful
analysis of such actions against owners and charters, since
ultimately they must take proper steps to protect against piracy.
A crewmember's loss of earning capacity is recoverable and
depends on the degree of injury, life expectancy, and earning
capacity at the time of injury. 82 Recoveries may also be made for
"pain, suffering, mental anguish, discomfort, and
inconvenience."83 With the exception of loss of society, seaman are
generally able to recover quite well, and while loss of earnings are
calculable to a degree, the damage level for pain and suffering as
well as loss of enjoyment of life (as encompassed by the discomfort
and inconvenience language) is a question for the jury.
The GML still provides for an action for maintenance and
cure, and injured seamen will almost always recover with or
without a Jones Act claim, because employers have an automatic
duty to provide it.8 4 Maintenance and cure consists of medical
expenses from the time the injury is discovered until maximum
recovery is obtained, wages due for the voyage, and food and
lodging due for the duration of the voyage. 85 In the case of pirate
men in the calling').
81. Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 327 (1960).
82. See Downie v. United States Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344, 347 (3d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 897 (1966).
83. Id. (holding discomfort and inconvenience are interpretable as loss of
enjoyment of life); see also Blanco v. Phoenix Compania De Navegacion, 304
F.2d 13, 16 (4th Cir. 1962).
84. See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527-28 (1938) (holding
that an owner need not be negligent or culpable to assert a maintenance and
cure claim and that even incurable diseases not caused by the voyage require
maintenance and cure).
85. Id. at 654. Maximum recovery could mean complete recovery, the
maximum recovery possible (such as replacing a lost limb with a prosthetic
and conditioning the patient to its use through therapy), or death. Food,
lodging, and lost wages are only recoverable for the duration of a voyage.
Hence, if a seaman is badly injured within the first minute of a three month
voyage, the employer must still feed, house, and pay the seaman for three
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attacks, seamen will be able to recover: (1) the medical expenses
for treatment of any injuries attained; (2) the expenses for food
and lodging (if they are removed from the vessel) equal in value to
what was provided aboard for the remainder of the voyage; and
(3)their wages for the voyage. Furthermore, a seaman who is
denied maintenance and cure may pursue punitive damages for
breach of duty.86 Ultimately, maintenance and cure damages will
vary greatly depending upon the type of injury, how long it takes
the seaman to fully recover, and the seaman's wage level.
Posttraumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") is a common injury
among pirate victims. In fact, while the suit against Maersk Lines
and Waterman Steamship fails to describe Mr. Hicks' injury (it
does however seek maintenance and cure)87 press interviews
indicated that PTSD was probably the crux of his complaint.
88
Courts interpreting the Jones Act permit recovery for PTSD,
which is often a large sum, depending on the circumstances.
While the Hicks complaint prays for $75,000 and reserves the
right to amend the amount in the future, 89 a twenty year overview
of Jones Act claims, including an allegation of PTSD, shows
recoveries ranging from $40,000 to $1.75 million, with the most
typical recovery falling somewhere around $400,000.90 Going by
months.
86. See Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S.Ct. 2561, 2566 (2009).
The Court explained that because the Jones Act was created to expand rather
than restrict a seaman's recovery, the GML recoveries are preserved where
not incorporated by the Act, and among them is the ability to pursue punitive
damages. Id. at 2570-71. The Court's punitive damages focus seems to be
entirely on maintenance and cure denials. See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369
U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962) (holding that awarding of attorney's fees was a
permissible means of punishing refusal to provide maintenance and cure).
87. Complaint at 4, Hicks v. Waterman S.S. Corp., No. 2009-26129 (Dist.
Ct. Harris Cnty., Tex. Apr. 27, 2009).
88. See Malek, supra note 2. Like many other Jones Act cases alleging
PTSD, Mr. Hicks repeatedly stated that he "didn't know if [he] was going to
live or die" and that he was unsure if he would ever return to merchant
marine life. See id.
89. Complaint at 8, Hicks v. Waterman S.S. Corp., No. 2009-26129 (Dist.
Ct. Harris Cnty., Tex. Apr. 27, 2009).
90. See, e.g., Pallis v United States, No. 3:07-CV-00202, 2008 WL
5545389 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2008); Hamilton v Maritrans, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-
607, 2007 WL 4570276 (S.D. Tex Oct. 1, 2007); Acevedo v Sea-Land Serv.,
Inc., No. 91032, 1990 WL 10080361 (Cal.Super. Ct.); Bryant v DHL Marine,
Inc., No. 821-329, 1987 WL 957673 (Cal. Super. Ct.); Lecain v Exxon
Shipping Co., No. 92-26833-21, 1995 WL 680960 (Fla.Cir.Ct. Jan. 17, 1995);
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these figures, Hicks is fairly conservative in asking for $75,000
and will likely receive a good chunk of it, if not in settlement then
in a jury verdict.
C. Death on the High Seas Act
The Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA") is another
statutory construction providing a remedy for a "decedent's
spouse, parent, child, or dependent relative" where the death
occurred on the high seas more than three nautical miles from the
United States shore. 91 Such an action may be brought against
either the person or vessel whose "wrongful act, neglect, or
default" caused the death. 92 Both Americans and foreign citizens
may bring a DOHSA claim, for it is well established that foreign
citizens may bring a cause of action in American courts, and
though maritime liability statutes have some restrictions on
claims by non-Americans, generally such a claim will be
maintainable under DOHSA. 93
Under DOHSA, victims of piracy have a source of recovery
that extends beyond their own employers to the supporters of
piracy. The statutory history of DOHSA shows that, as originally
worded, it applies to persons, vessels, and corporations, but was
revised to apply only to persons and vessels "because of 1 U.S.C.
§1., ' 94 1 U.S.C. §1 describes "[w]ords denoting number, gender,
and so forth" and defines "person" as including "corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint
stock companies." 95  Hence, it is possible to bring an action
Roberts v Ridgon Marine Corp., No. CV-06-8843, 2007 WL 2728322
(Tex.Dist. Ct. Aug. 22, 2007); Poole v Cal Dive Int'l, Inc., No. 2002-3652, 2003
WL 22998460 (Tex.Dist. Ct. Oct. 3, 2003). It should be noted that these
figures do not adjust for inflation during that time.
91. 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006).
92. Id.
93. 46 U.S.C. § 30105 (non-citizens employed by a party engaged in
exploration, development, or production of offshore mineral or energy
resources are not covered if the death occurred in foreign territorial waters or
overlaying a foreign continental shelf, unless the employer is engaged in bulk
transportation of oil by vessel, or the country with jurisdiction has no
available remedy, or the country of citizenship has no available remedy). Id.
94. 46 U.S.C. § 30302 note (2006) (Historical and Revision Notes).
95. 1 U.S.C.A. § 1 (2011). See Williams v. United States, 42 F.R.D. 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (quoting Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108, 112 (1959))
(holding that whether the term person includes a state or not "depends upon
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against supporters of organized piracy as their wrongful acts
contributed to the individual's death. However, this Comment
presumes that the representatives of a decedent will not wish to
spend the significant time and large amounts of money on a
complicated suit against pirates. Rather they will wish to achieve
a quick recovery against the employer under the Jones Act, or
vessel and owner under DOHSA and the GML.
The problem with DOHSA damages is that it specifically
provides for pecuniary damages only, and allows a proportional
reduction of these damages where the deceased's negligence
contributed to his or her death. 96 These pecuniary damages are
interpreted to mean loss of support and funeral expenses, but do
not include lost future earnings. 9 7  This Comment mentions
DOHSA merely to illustrate that other legal mechanisms exist
(both statutory and under the GML) that may be used to
compensate pirate victims for their injuries.
D. Brief Application of the Law
For the sake of simplicity, let us ignore all the interesting
twists and turns that actions under the Jones Act, DOHSA, and
the GML could take with regard to the hypothetical case of the
Kill Devil Hills, and instead focus on the most likely outcome. The
crewmembers are seamen for purposes of GML and Jones Act
application, and should therefore recover maintenance and cure,
which requires no showing of either negligence or
unseaworthiness. There is a good chance that the court will find
that the Kill Devil Hills was unseaworthy for purposes of the
Jones Act and GML, because its voyage entailed traversing known
pirate waters, yet the owner took no precautions to protect the
ship and crew from that obvious risk.98 Therefore, the ship was
a legislative environment" of the applicable statute); see also Moran v. United
States, 102 F.Supp. 275, 277, 279 (D. Conn. 1951) (finding that the United
States may be sued under provisions of DOHSA).
96. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30303-04 (2006).
97. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 35 (1990); Sabine Towing
Co. v. Brennan, 85 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 599
(1936), and reh. denied, 299 U.S. 624 (1936).
98. While picking a different sea route is probably not a reasonable
precaution, given the tremendous cost and additional risk involved in
bypassing the Gulf of Aden, the failure to hire a professional security team
for that leg of the voyage and especially the failure to equip the ship with
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not reasonably fit for her intended voyage. Likewise, the court
will probably find that the injuries were caused to some degree by
the negligence of the employer, in that Mr. Agent knew of the
possibility of pirate attack but did nothing other than buying
additional insurance, 99 and the romantic but reckless Captain
Daring convinced an unarmed crew to physically resist armed
pirates. 00 The plaintiffs can easily establish causation; therefore,
they can recover with either a finding of unseaworthiness or
negligence.
Recovery amounts in the case of the Kill Devil Hills could
range into millions of dollars. There are several plaintiffs who are
exhibiting signs of PTSD, and those that were injured may recover
among other things for pain and suffering as well as lost future
income and possibly even loss of enjoyment of life. The estates of
the two deceased plaintiffs (one of whom was not a seaman but is
still covered under DOHSA) may also recover, for the pecuniary
losses specified in DOHSA often add up to hefty amounts
depending on the decedent's earning history and number of
qualifying dependents. Suffice it to say that even if the
defendants in this hypothetical settle, they could easily end up
paying more to the plaintiffs than they did to the pirates.
III. TAKING THE FIGHT TO ORGANIZED PIRACY
Having concluded that seamen and other victims may recover
under admiralty law for injuries resulting from piracy, this
Comment now sails further into uncharted waters. The question
becomes: how to employ such actions against the institution of
organized piracy. The companies and owners of merchant ships,
while named as defendants in the suits, are paying most if not all
of the recoveries from their insurance policies. Maritime
insurance companies ("insurance") however, have their own
overhanging barbed wire or to coordinate with the international armada or
join a convoy will likely be enough to establish unseaworthiness.
99. This hypothetical presumes that even though the owner of the Kill
Devil Hills and employer of the crew are different entities, the employer as
charterer of the ship acts as a sort of temporary owner, or owner "pro hac
vice."
100. This Comment is ignoring any application of the Limitation of
Liability Act, which would be easily overridden by the knowledge attributable
to the owner through Mr. Agent, as well as the negligence of Captain Daring,
which is also attributable to the owner when death or injury results.
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business to run, and the need to reduce risk and recoup lost
damage awards should be a strong incentive to seek compensation
for maritime tort losses from the pirates themselves. This
Comment now proposes that to combat organized piracy, Jones
Act defendants should seek guidance from those victims of the
War on Terror who struck back at their tormentors with American
tort law.
A. Additional Monetary Losses to Piracy
In addition to the tort recoveries of pirate victims, the
expenses of ransom, cargo loss, cargo damage, breach of contract,
and the extraordinary business loss of having an entire working
ship simply sitting still while ransom negotiations are ongoing
combine to place a huge burden on owners, charterers, and
insurance. While the Maersk Alabama did not ultimately pay a
ransom, the hypothetical Kill Devil Hills does, and trends
throughout the globe already show that insurance provides both
the ransom and the costs of delivery to the pirates, 101 and some of
the other costs that can result from a pirate attack, such as
damaged cargo, fallen market prices, breach of contract, speed
retarding sea growth on the hull, and so on. Remember that in
our hypothetical the Kill Devil Hills delivered two damaged
containers of valuable electronics, for which the cargo insurer will
want reimbursement. At least some of these losses are
recoverable in admiralty.
The point in mentioning recoveries for cargo, breach of
contract, ransoms, and the like is that owners and insurance will
have more piracy related expenses than those imposed by liability
to the victims. These aggregate expenses will hopefully have the
dual effect of motivating insurance providers to initiate suits to
recoup losses, while piling additional monetary losses on the
financial supporters and profiteers of piracy, making it less
profitable and therefore a less desirable business. The numerous
Jones Act claims that may result from an attack (each of which
101. Friederike Krieger, Owners Turn to Kidnap and Ransom Cover,
LLOYD'S LIST, May 28, 2009, at 9. The U.S. based insurer Chubb is already
offering K&R policies that include liability cover. Id. Other types of pre-
existing insurance may also be used to cover pirate imposed expenses in lieu
of a K&R policy. Id.
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could, in the case of an injured crewmember, result in multi-
million dollar recoveries) can at least contribute to an overall
recovery against organized piracy and may even be the trigger for
corporate action.
B. Jones Act Contribution and FELA
The automatic incorporation of FELA case history into Jones
Act litigation provides an especially useful mechanism for tackling
piracy. The Court has held that in FELA litigation, an injured
plaintiff may bring suit solely against his or her employer, and
recover for the full injury even when multiple other tortfeasors
may have contributed to the injury.10 2 If the injury was caused in
any degree by the employer's negligence, the employer is liable for
all of the injury, less only what was caused by the employee's
negligence. Having satisfied the judgment, the employer is then
free to seek contribution from the other tortfeasors.'° 3 Likewise,
the employer may implead third parties into Jones Act litigation
for apportionment in the forum, 10 4 and the plaintiffs may even
cross claim against the third party defendants. 105
Because Congress incorporated FELA into the Jones Act, the
decisions in FELA cases became precedent for Jones Act litigation
and hence, seamen injured in a pirate attack may seek total
recovery (absent anything attributable to their own negligence)
from their employers. The employers are then free to seek
contribution from the pirates or the supporters of piracy at their
leisure. 10 6  In the practical world, this precedent allows the
injured seamen, who will rarely have the time or the resources to
go through a complicated suit against organized piracy, a quick
and easy road to relief, while insurance companies, who will
ultimately bear the monetary loss, may proceed against the
102. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 165-66 (2003).
103. Id. at 165 n. 23.
104. Id.
105. See Carpenter v. Mobile Dredging & Pumping Co., No. 99-5386,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4112, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2004).
106. See, e.g., Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd. 575 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir.
2009). In this case, a sea captain was injured by a food lift and the employer
and ship owner settled and brought a third party action against the ship
builder. Id. at 1158-61. Some of the claims were dismissed after finding that
the negligence and products liability were controlled by Dutch law due to the
location of the food lift. Id. at 1158, 1180.
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institution of organized piracy with the superior legal resources at
their disposal.1 07  The injured seaman will obtain speedy relief
and organized piracy will face a much more formidable legal foe.
One might argue that insurance is unlikely to bring about
such a complicated suit, simply because they would not wish to
waste the time and legal fees on the mere possibility of
contribution, which is a different situation than their necessary
defense against claims by Jones Act seamen. This argument
ignores the influence of greed'0 8 (applications of which can be
useful) by assuming that insurance companies are content to take
the losses and be happy with the profits they make out of the ratio
of sold K&R policies to actual recoveries. However, implicit in the
preceding citations is the fact that employers, owners, and their
insurance providers often commence contribution and indemnity
suits rather than simply eating the cost of a plaintiffs recovery.
C. Rule B and Asset Seizure
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rule B
("Rule B") allows plaintiffs in suits at admiralty to attach
defendants' tangible and intangible property when the defendants
are not present within a district. 109 This is a powerful rule that
makes it possible for plaintiffs to pin down the assets of highly
mobile defendants, and in practice it is often used as leverage in
settlement negotiations.' 10 For seven years, the Second Circuit
held that electronic fund transfers ("EFTs") constituted property
and was attachable under Rule B. "'1 The application of Rule B by
107. See Tri-State Oil Tool Indus., Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410
F.2d 178, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that a party that is actively
negligent should bear the consequences and indemnify a passively wrong
Jones Act defendant, even when there was no contractual relationship
between the two). This is applicable to a pirate victim's employer who seeks
contribution against the supporters of piracy who were the active wrongdoers
but have no contractual relationship to the employer.
108. A gentler way to put it is, "fiduciary responsibility to investors to
cultivate the company's financial resources."
109. FED. R. Crv. P. Supp. R. B(1)(a).
110. Traditionally, the rule was intended to allow the quick arrest of a
defendant's ship as it stopped briefly in a port. Defendants almost always
provide a relief fund to secure the release of the ship so that it may go back to
making money, rather than sit idle in a port and collect rust as the litigation
drags out. Today the rule is used to seize almost any kind of property.
111. See Winter Storm Shipping, Ltd. v TPI, 310 F.3d 263, 278 (2d Cir.
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the Second Circuit created a boom for maritime attorneys as most
financial institutions throughout the world wire money through
banks in New York City, and most money transfers by parties
throughout the world therefore pass momentarily through the
Second Circuit, becoming attachable. The banking industry found
Rule B's application extremely burdensome and in autumn of 2009
the Second Circuit overruled itself, holding that EFTs were no
longer attachable under Rule B because for the split second it
takes for one to pass through the district, neither the party
sending nor the party receiving has a property interest in it.
112
The Second Circuit's reversal of precedent no doubt upset
maritime practitioners while pleasing bankers in New York City;
and it remains to be seen whether other circuits will ever weigh in
on the matter, as the burdens to bankers probably influenced the
decision more than the argument that parties do not possess a
property interest in their EFTs. 
1 13
In overruling its former application of Rule B, the Second
Circuit noted that Rule B is intended to be a quasi- in- rem action,
and may still be applied to bank accounts so long as they are not
EFT's transitioning through an intermediary bank.1 14 However,
EFT's traceable to illegal activity are still subject to forfeiture for
purposes of in rem jurisdiction. 115 As piracy is undeniably illegal,
2002).
112. Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 58,
67, 71 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1896 (2010).
113. See id. at 61-64. The court spends a lot of time discussing the
unforeseen effects of Winter Storm, the negative commentary, and the
attempts by lower courts to curb the affect than it spends on its analysis of
the issue, and even states, "the effects [of allowing Rule B attachment of
EFTs] on the federal courts and international banks in New York are too
significant[.j" Id. at 67.
114. Id. at 69-71.
115. Id. at 68-69; see 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2006). Rule B is a different
mechanism than the civil forfeiture, which could be applied in an action
against organized piracy but would likely involve more burden to a plaintiff
than a Rule B attachment. For example, in a civil forfeiture, the property
must be seized by the Attorney General, Secretary of Treasury, or U.S. Postal
Service, and may then be disposed of in a number of ways including as
restoration to a victim. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(b)(1), 981(e)(6) (2006). Rule B
attachments require far less effort, and typically take only a matter of hours
between identifying the property and having it seized. Rule B is designed
and operates for speed, so that historically a defendant's ship would not have
time to dock, conduct business, and weigh anchor before the sheriff arrived
with a court order to impound it.
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EFT seizure prior to judgment may still be possible, and Rule B
still provides the ability to seize bank or other non-EFT assets to
secure jurisdiction and a judgment fund. All that is needed is an
appropriately tailored admiralty action against the proper
defendants, and an affidavit stating that the defendant cannot be
found within the district. 116 So long as the underlying claim is
maritime 117 (which pirate attack is), and the named third party
defendants have established minimum contacts with the United
States, 118 an action exists.
D. The RICO and Anti-Terrorism Acts
Assume that the insurance and Bogue Island Inc. (our
hypothetical ship owner) have hired private investigators to
identify the parties that invested in or supported the attack on
Kill Devil Hills. Also assume that having identified some
supporters of the attack (such as the diaspora communities in
Maine, Canada, and France, and the Kenyan businesses), the
owners and insurers, as defendants in a Jones Act case, have
brought a third-party action and attached assets pursuant to Rule
B.119 In addition to indemnification or contribution, the owners
and insurers as third party plaintiffs may now bring additional
claims against the supporters of piracy. 
120
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO") makes it criminal for any person associated with an
enterprise engaged in foreign commerce to conduct its activities
through a pattern of racketeering activity. 121 More importantly
for the matter at hand, those injured either in business or
116. See FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B(1)(b).
117. Id. atA(1)(A).
118. See e.g., Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne
de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1979).
119. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1).
120. See id. at (a)(3); see also id. at 9(h). The requirement that the
additional claims be made in admiralty should not be a problem as the
probative facts supporting all of the claims was an organized pirate attack on
a vessel engaged in commerce in navigable waters. This should satisfy both
the nexus and locus tests required for admiralty jurisdiction. See Sisson v.
Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 362, 364 (1990); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457
U.S. 668, 673-74 (1982); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409
U.S. 249, 268 (1972).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006); see also id. §1961 (defining racketeering
activity); see also id. § 1962(c) (prohibiting racketeering activity).
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property damaged by a RICO violator may bring suit, and "shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee," a recovery that would be
extremely desirable to insurance burdened by pirate attacks.
122
One might argue that any Somali pirate is associated with the
Somali fishing industry (a foreign commerce enterprise due to the
exportation of shellfish), and that the repeated acts of kidnapping
are punishable by more than one year's imprisonment in at least
one if not all of the states. 123 Therefore, Somali pirates are all
chargeable under the RICO act under at least one of several
interpretations. 124 The civil provisions allow a plaintiff to recover
against anyone who is chargeable under RICO, which arguably
includes those who support piracy by providing money,
equipment, or information. 125
Insurance plaintiffs may encounter problems in alleging
RICO violations against supporters of organized piracy. Victims
of terrorism have supplemented their claims against terrorism
and its supporters with RICO violations, but have found courts
"quick to dismiss RICO claims" despite a congressional intent to
provide terrorist victims with additional relief.126  The quick
dismissals seem based on plaintiffs failing to allege that the
"defendants were 'central figures' in the [underlying] schemes"
and appear to result from a court desire to deter frivolous RICO
litigation resulting from the hefty recovery levels. 127 There has
also been some disagreement as to whether a civil action under
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
123. Id. § 1961 (2006). The reference to state law is how the statute
defines the underlying crimes that might constitute racketeering for a civil
RICO action. See id.
124. See id. § 1962 (2006). The RICO act makes a large number of
activities criminal; the defining element seems to be the existence of a
pattern of such activity. See id. § 1962(b).
125. See id. § 1964(c) (2006). The criminal section of RICO includes those
parties associated with an enterprise that affects foreign commerce (which
could include businesses, investors, or diaspora communities that
communicate with Somali pirates) if those parties participate even indirectly
with the racketeering activity (such as providing money and information to
those who repeatedly engage in successful or attempted acts of piracy). See
id. § 1962(c).
126. Shipman, supra note 59 at 543.
127. Id. (quoting In re Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 827-28
(S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
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RICO may compensate personal injuries. 128
Nevertheless, a RICO action might prevail against organized
piracy for three reasons. First, even though the Anti-Terrorism
Act ("ATA") may be applicable to piracy, it was not specifically
designed for pirate victims. The courts hearing terrorist lawsuits
may have dismissed the RICO claims because of the existence and
purpose of the ATA, which provides equal relief. Secondly, unlike
the supporters and funders of terrorism who get no monetary
return for their contributions, the supporters of organized piracy
are not acting out of religious charity. They are investing money
in a racketeering organization in expectation of return profits.
For these reasons it is possible for a RICO claim to prevail against
the supporters of organized piracy. Third, even though the
plaintiffs' physical injuries might not satisfy standing under
RICO, the third party plaintiffs' injuries do, for their businesses
have suffered monetary losses, both direct (in the case of ransoms)
and indirect (in the case of Jones Act judgments or settlements),
because of the pirate attack. The possibility of a successful RICO
action is made more probable by the Court's past holding that civil
RICO should be liberally construed to better deter racketeering
activities which harm foreign commerce. 129
The ATA may also be useful as organized piracy arguably
exhibits some of the defining qualities of international
terrorism. 130  The difference is that where traditional terrorists
want to effect political or religious change through violence,
traditional pirates want money. As stated earlier, Somalia's
organized piracy differs from the random acts of nautical robbery
that dominate the rest of the globe. Somali pirates began by
saying that they wanted foreign encroachment in their territorial
waters to stop, a motivation that is analogous to many demands
by modern terrorist organizations. Likewise, Somali pirates have
128. See Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 102
(D. D.C. 2003) (holding that those physically injured or killed in the attacks
on Sept. 11, 2001 have no standing to sue under RICO, which requires an
injury to business or property). But see Rice v. Janovich, 742 P.2d 1230,
1237-38 (Wash. 1987) (holding that lost wages resulting from the personal
injury sustained in a bombing satisfied standing under RICO).
129. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 497, 497-98 (1985).
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2006) (defining "international terrorism," in
pertinent part, as violent acts committed primarily outside U.S. jurisdiction
that are intended to coerce a government).
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recently increased their level of violence, allegedly in response to
the incarceration of several comrades.1 31 Such use of kidnapping,
violence, and assassination to affect government conduct outside
American jurisdiction is the very definition of international
terrorism and supports such a finding in contribution litigation. 1
32
The civil provisions of the ATA allow suit by a U.S. national
injured in "person, property, or business" by the terrorist acts and
requires a recovery of treble damages as well as the cost of the
suit and attorney's fees. 133 Aside from this favorable recovery
allowance, the ATA also allows suit against parties that aid and
abet terrorist organizations, including those who provide the
necessary funds. 134 This will probably make it easier to establish
liability than under RICO. Like RICO, the ATA presents a
powerful claim that would be quite profitable for insurance and
very damaging to the institution of piracy. This Comment leaves
further examination or rebuttal of these and any other legal
theories, as well as the application of other federal statutes
against organized piracy, to the investigators, litigators, and legal
scholars.
This Comment concludes by positing that either the ATA or
RICO Act may be applicable to an insurance company against the
institution of organized piracy. When pirate victims bring suit
against their employers or ships' owners, the insurance defendant
may extend the action against pirates, expatriate supporters,
business supporters, business borrowers, corrupt politicians, and
whoever else that they can identify through investigation who is
connected to the organization. In this third-party action, the
insurer may claim alternate causes of action under the ATA and
RICO acts under Rule 14(a)(3) because its monetary losses are due
to the same third-party defendant activity that injured the
131. Paul Goldsmith, Are Pirates Really in Pursuit of High-Value Loot?,
THE EAST AFRICAN (Nairobi), Nov. 23, 2009 (noting that two recent local
assassinations were probably due to the deceased's jailing of local pirates,
and also noting that the recent hellish conditions imposed on a crew of
kidnapped Spanish fishermen contrasted with the usual humane treatment
because the Spanish government was holding two pirates).
132. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2006).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006).
134. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1003, 1021
(N.D. Ill. 2001), affd 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
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plaintiff, namely the pirate attack. 135 While a court will not likely
allow claims under both statutes to go forth at once, by pleading
them in the alternate there is a good possibility that one will
succeed. Because the pirate activity satisfies the nexus and locus
tests for admiralty jurisdiction, the supplemental rules for speedy
attachment of assets to provide not only quasi in rem jurisdiction
but a ready relief fund may be used to guarantee payment of the
inevitable judgment. 136
CONCLUSION
To briefly conclude, it appears that piracy off the coast of
Somalia began in the vacuum of lawlessness as a response to
foreign encroachments on territorial waters. It has since evolved
into a system of organized crime, in which many parties are
profiting. Even though the deprived citizens of Somalia may be
benefiting from this institution, organized piracy must be quickly
put down to avoid similar institutions sprouting elsewhere
throughout the world. To that end, military force is necessary
only for the short term to provide security, political action is
necessary to improve Somalia's internal controls via a worldwide
response, and the assets of those parties who support and profit
from organized piracy, not out of desperation but out of greed,
must be seized to deter future profiteers.
The Jones Act is designed to provide maximum protection for
seaman, because they work in a hostile environment from which
they cannot simply walk away mid voyage. It allows a good
recover at a minimum showing of negligence and causation. It is
very likely that a victim of piracy can recover for injuries against a
ship owner and his or her employer under the Jones Act. Not only
American seaman, but foreign seaman can take advantage of such
litigation under appropriate conditions.
The vessel owners' and the insurance's losses in a Jones Act
135. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(3).
136. In this manner, third-party plaintiffs can avoid the typical outcome
for terror litigants, in which the defendants never appear and a default
judgment is entered, only for the defendants to then argue the damages for
years on end. Most of the interesting legal work involved with the pre-9/11
terror litigation has been the efforts by plaintiffs' attorneys to seize assets to
satisfy the judgments. The judgments were fairly easy to obtain, but pinning
down the assets post judgment has proven difficult.
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litigation combine with other business losses sustained in a pirate
attack. By bringing a contribution action against the pirate
organizations and their supporters an insurer may be able to
recoup business losses and hurt the institution of piracy by
making it less profitable. By including RICO or ATA claims,
insurance and owners can recover court costs and threefold their
losses, making such an action very desirable and further hurting
piracy. While admiralty law allows speedy attachment of assets to
secure quasi in rem jurisdiction and a recovery fund, the pirates
themselves will likely have no assets worth attaching. However,
diaspora communities and businesses who aid and invest in
organized piracy probably do have such assets and may also be
joined as defendants to the action. By bringing alternate
statutory claims, an insurance attorney may be able to attain
large recoveries, thus further undermining the business of piracy
and aiding in its eradication.
